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Introduction
 More than one million websites use SSL to 
protect their transactions
 Average monthly grow of 18,000 certificates
 Attackers always try to circumevent it
 Forging certificates
 SSL stripping
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MITM attack
 Active eavesdropping
 Attacker places himself between two victims 
and relays messages between them
 Reading
 Writing
 Altering
 Misuse of the ARP
protocol
  
MITM attack & SSL
 The attacker can either:
 Forward the original certificate of the web server 
and lose the ability to eavesdrop on data
 Craft his own certificate and forward that to the user 
while establishing a ”normal” encrypted session 
with the web server
  
MITM attack
 But all that was before SSL strip
 Presented as part of the ”New tricks for defeating 
SSL” talk in BlackHat 2009
 Enables MITM attackers to continue to 
eavesdrop on data even when the websites 
operate over SSL
 How?!?
  
SSL Stripping workings
 Users rarely type ”https://”
 Webservers redirect them through 302 Messages 
(HTTP MOVED)
 Secure links and form targets
 All of this is done behind the scenes (by the 
server & user's browser without the users 
knowledge)
  
HTTP Moved Messages
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.paypal.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 100
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2010 13:56:51 GMT
Server: Apache
Location: https://www.paypal.com/
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 0
Secure Connection to 
https://www.paypal.com
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HTTP Moved Messages
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.paypal.com
1. Establish secure connection with PayPal
HTTP/1.1 301 
Location: https://www.paypal.com/
2. Take the resulting HTML and return it to
the requesting user
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
<html><title>Paypal</title>....
Cleartext connection 
with PayPal relayed 
through the attacker's 
secure tunnel
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Effectiveness
 Why is this attack effective?
 Is it effective only against novice computer users or 
are ”we” vulnerable as well?
  
Negative Feedback in Software
  
SSL warnings - Firefox
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SSL warnings - Chrome
  
SSL warnings - Chrome
  
SSL Stripping
What the user sees...
  
Before SSL stripping
  
After SSL stripping
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Behind the scenes...
<form method="POST" 
action="https://login.facebook.com/login.php?
login_attempt=1" id="login_form">
<form method="POST" 
action="http://login.facebook.com/login.php?
login_attempt=1" id="login_form">
becomes
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Hproxy: History Proxy
 Leverage a browser's history
 Construct a security profile of each regurarly 
visited website
 Requests & Responses (R&R)
 What is ”expected” security-wise?
 Which parts of the website are protected by SSL?
 Use the current set of R&R and a detection 
ruleset to identify ”unexpected” behaviour
  
HProxy Architecture
  
Webpage Analyzer
 Module responsible for 
identifying & recording all 
sensitive data structures
 HTTP Messages
 Forms
 Iframes
 JavaScript code
 Profile Creation
  
MITM Identifier
 Combination of:
 Current R&R
 Original profile
 Detection Ruleset
 Drops the request and 
notifies the user in case of 
a MITM identification
  
PageTainter
 Failsafe module
 Preventing leakage when 
MITM Identifier emmits a 
false negative
 Identification of private 
data
 Monitoring & Tainting of 
all Forms
  
Detection Ruleset
 A set of pragmatic rules describing attack 
scenarios
 Rules for:
 HTTP MOVED message
 FORMS
 Iframe tags
 JavaScript code
  
Detection Ruleset: HTTP MOVED
Current Response Modification Allowed?
MOVED HTTPS 
domain_a/page_a
None Yes
MOVED HTTPS 
domain_a/page_b
Different Page Yes
MOVED HTTP 
domain_a/page_a
Non SSL No
MOVED HTTP 
domain_b/page_a
Different Domain No
MOVED HTTPS 
domain_b/page_a
Different Domain No
HTTP 200 OK
<html>....
OK instead of MOVED No
REQUEST: GET domain_a
ORIGINAL RESPONSE: MOVED HTTPS domain_a/page_a
  
Detection Ruleset: IFrames
 Simple rule:
 On login pages, no iframes tags are allowed
 Why?
 Clickjacking
 External JS sources loaded
<iframe    src=”...”>
  
Detection Ruleset: Forms
  
Detection Ruleset: Forms
 New forms
 Alert if:
 Login form with a different domain
 Absense of forms
 Alert if:
 Form missing is secure login form & new login 
form detected with different domain or non-SSL
 Modified forms:
 Alert if 
 Different domain or security downgrade 
  
Detection Ruleset: JavaScript
 JavaScript can be used to steal credentials in 
pages where the user types them in
 Differentiating between original & "added" JS
 Not an easy task
 Both internal & external JS can be abused
  
JavaScript Whitelisting
1.Identify JavaScript of login pages
2.HASH them
3.Store the hash in the page's profile
4.Compare the hash with all subsequent hashes
5.If they are not equal, MITM identified
Right?
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1.Identify JavaScript of login pages
2.HASH them
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5.If they are not equal, MITM identified
Right?
Wrong!
  
JavaScript Pre-processor
 Dynamic Web is more than dynamic HTML 
output
 JavaScript is also dynamic
 Making simple whitelisting, prone to false-positives
 Creation of dynamic JS templates for each 
website
 Recording the dynamic & static parts
  
JavaScript Pre-processor
 Two 
consecutive 
requests for the 
same page
 Recording the 
position & 
length of the 
changing parts
 Option for strict 
or flexible policy
Twitter's Login Page
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JS False-positives
3 Ways of whitelisting
a) MD5 checksum
b) JS Preprocessor
c) JS Preprocessor + 
 tolerance factor (10) 
  
Time Overhead
Average load time overhead of 500 locally served websites
No Proxy -> Hproxy: Overhead of 0.41 seconds
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Related work
 No work so far related specifically to SSL 
stripping attacks
 MITM & WiFi Impersonation Attacks Detection
 Leveraging
 802.11 protocol (Beacons)
 Physical characteristics of Wireless comm. (RSS)
 Warning systems
 Xia et. al
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Conclusion
 We analyzed and expanded SSL stripping 
attacks
 We presented a novel client-side detection 
mechanism for stripping attacks using a 
browser's history
 HProxy:
 Identified all attacks
 Acceptable performance
 Low false positive rate
  
Thank you
Questions?
nick.nikiforakis@cs.kuleuven.be
  
Defenses
 How can we defend against SSL stripping 
attacks?
 Server-side
 Global repository of SSL protected websites
 Each website providing a discovery service which 
the browser can use in order to determine the 
support of SSL
  Client-side
 Much harder since all the data coming in are 
potentially altered by the MITM
